"Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors, from different and hostile interests, which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good…

"Certainly, gentlemen, it ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative to live in the strictest union, with the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his constituents. Their wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinion high respect; their business unremitted attention… But his unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living. These he does not derive from your pleasure; no, nor from the law and the constitution. They are a trust from Providence, for the abuse of which he is deeply answerable."

-Edmund Burke, 1774

The constitution of a nation is the fundamental, organic law of that nation as a human society. Americans, however, confuse the written Constitution of 1787, the constitution of the republic, with the true constitution -- the ancient constitution -- which is unwritten, and can be found in the principles of law that are the basis of the judicial system of all countries based on the English model of law. The principal jurist whose work became the basis of much of modern Anglo-American law, Sir Edward Coke, held that all valid law must be measured against a higher law, that is based on a precious heritage of immutable principles.

The republic is not legal for various reasons, but the main reason is that it is not formulated according to the ancient constitution. The law did not just suddenly exist, out of nowhere; it evolved over several thousands of years, and it is based on the acceptance of the people themselves in the most democratic form known to humanity, as custom. Customs are the practices of the people themselves as they have been practiced since "time immemorial." This contrasts directly with the "legislation" of Congress, which is not a legitimate parliament, and the product of which is compromised from the beginning.

Constitutional institutions evolved over thousands of years based on real needs, and the real experiences of the community. They were not created by a single enactment on a single day, by attorneys and principals who stood to gain from the enactment, (which is how the republic was instituted), but by a long history that established the principles and conventions that would become the basis of a democratic constitutional order. The institutions of the republic were designed with the sole purpose in mind of subverting the ancient constitution, and to create a facsimile of a legitimate government, while dividing power and responsibility in such a way, that if a man of integrity actually slipped into power, he could be controlled by the ruling class.

Constitutional government is government in which the use of power is restrained by a constitution which defines the functions of various power-holders. Restraint necessarily calls for dividing governmental power. Undivided power is unrestrained power. However, except in small communities, constitutional government is impossible without a system of representation. Historically, most European countries developed representative assemblies in the later middle ages. Though variations existed, a pattern emerged in continental Europe of three estates composed of nobility, clergy and the merchants of the cities, who were called the burgesses. In the English parliament, on the other hand, the higher nobility was joined by the senior clergy in "the lords spiritual and temporal," while the lower nobility (called the squirearchy) joined together with the burgesses to constitute the House of Commons. The English system of two estates proved to be more viable than the European system of three estates, and actually became the basis for all modern parliaments of two chambers.

The representatives of the House of Commons were originally called by the crown in order to secure additional financial support over and above the old feudal dues. Naturally, these representatives proceeded to use the opportunity of a meeting of the Commons to present complaints and petitions in an effort to strike a bargain. Medieval society being a class-based society, these complaints also naturally favored their own class, and the representatives served as agents of local powers, acting under instructions or mandates. After the deal was struck, the king and the two houses of parliament acted together as "the king in parliament," which was taken to represent the whole realm.

Not only does constitutional government depend upon representation, but representation in turn depends upon constitutionalism. Unless the community is ready to agree upon and live in accordance to law, plans for representation will break down. Representation depends upon beliefs the people hold in common, and while there is no need for agreement on fundamentals other than the constitutional principles themselves, which is called constitutional morality, these principles are of paramount importance.

Since the 16^th century, legislation has been considered the most important phase of governmental action. Legislation involves the making of rules binding upon the whole community. Such general rules should bear the closest possible relation to the community's general beliefs. This is the higher law which Sir Edward Coke, and others, expounded on. The Protestant idea that one cannot force men in matters of belief reinforced the idea of the necessity of consent in issues of general legislation. A specific act of government may be justified in terms of a specific emergency, but no general rule can be considered valid unless assented to by those to whom it is to be applied. Also, a general rule presupposes that there is a series of events which have certain aspects in common. There must be a normal situation. If an event is recurrent, time elapses between events, and therefore there is time available for deliberation to determine what is right and proper. The deliberative processes suit the relatively slow procedure of representative bodies. Nevertheless, the procedure of a well-organized parliament is so arranged as to result in action, namely the adoption of a general rule. The enactment of such a general rule requires the reconciliation of conflicting interests, and through argument and discussion an area of agreement can be arrived at in the representative legislature. Parliament symbolizes the consent which legislation presupposes, in order to be compatible with the dignity of man's autonomy in matters of his conviction and belief.

The Greeks lived in city-states which made it possible for individuals to represent themselves. Aristotle deemed this participation so vital that he opposed any polity larger than the average city-state. However, this scheme foundered when the city-state of Rome expanded beyond the city of Rome itself. The Romans tried to remedy this by embodying the citizenry of each city of the empire with common Roman citizenship, which became the basis for the principle that people are equal before the law. The Roman constitution unquestionably contained elements of genuine representation, which were crippled by the ascendancy of the unrepresentative Senate. After the fall of Rome, medieval towns, shires and monasteries developed a spirit of corporate solidarity sufficiently to make the group willing to participate in the larger community through delegates. Unless such solidarity is achieved providing a common base of ideas, true representation is impossible.

Of course, in a constitution that is based on defining the functions of various power-holders, it should be understood that individuals were deemed as possessing powers that they inherited as a folkright. This became the basis in modern law of the idea that individuals possess rights in law. The folkright came from the ancient Anglo-Saxon law, when many different folk or tribes occupied England, and the King of All England was obliged to rule each tribe according to its own law. When the Common Law was evolved from this group of tribes into a single rule, the idea of the folkright evolved to represent rights possessed collectively by the people as a matter of ancient custom. This also contrasts with the idea of "rights" under the republic and the Bill of Rights to the Constitution of 1787, which are not rights at all, but privileges granted by the Federal Government, which it is empowered to revoke at its pleasure. Genuine rights are inalienable, and have their origin in the birth of a natural corporate person.

The British electoral system is based on a single-member constituency, decided by relative majority or plurality, meaning that the candidate for election from a precinct who secures the largest number of votes wins the seat. The parliamentary system is a two-party system, but unlike the two-party system under the United States republic, which turns the two dominant political parties into virtual extensions of the state, British political parties are not fixtures. There is an actual competition in Britain between the parties, whereas in the United States the parties operate on a bi-partisan basis, in effect forming one party divided into two factions. The symbiotic relationship between the major parties in the United States -- whereby they co-exist while detesting each other -- abrogates any real potential for a genuine opposition force to form within the government.

The parliamentary system is clearly directed toward the goal of dividing each constituency, and thereby the whole nation, into two parts: the majority which is to govern and the minority which is to criticize. This provides a real basis for an opposition to form against the government. On the other hand, in the United States there is no institutional basis for an opposition to form. The Democrats and the Republicans make the claim that they are in opposition to each other, but in fact they must agree on so much in order to rule, they in fact only disagree over trivialities (e.g., whether the Capital Gains Tax should be higher or lower, etc.)

In a number of European countries representation is based on the idea of "proportional representation." Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden all use proportional representation. Germany has a "mixed" system, applying the principles of "majority" and "proportional" representation. Under proportional representation, the political parties have to gain the support of a minimum percentage of the electorate, as expressed by votes, in order to gain seats in the parliament. Then the seats are allocated based on the percentage of the vote every party received, so that if a party received 15% of the vote, it would receive 15% of the seats in the parliament. Under a monarchical head of state, experience has proven that proportional representation may work better than a majority system.

THE CROWN IN THE CONSTITUTION

The original constitutional institution is the Crown, which is embodied in the person of the sovereign. While the sovereignty of the monarch, and therefore the government, derives of the sovereignty of the people, under the ancient constitution the chief of the tribe, the king, is nominally referred to as "the sovereign." The monarchy is defined by the institution of the Crown, which had its origins in the primeval mists of pre-historic Germany, where the English people had their origins. The monarchs were originally elected, as was the tradition for all Germanic peoples. The echoes of this origin can be found in the Coronation ritual, when the people acclaim the new monarch.

The kingship was still an Anglo-Saxon chieftaincy at the time of the Norman Conquest, after which the French influence that came with the Normans modified the monarchy, and began the process that led to the evolution of the monarchy as the chief executive of the government. Most of the great departments of state evolved out of the Norman Curia Regis (Royal Court), and the Privy Council, which is still the means by which the royal authority of the monarch is exercised on behalf of the elected majority in parliament. The kingship, however, is no longer a strictly hereditary monarchy, for after the Revolution of 1688 the succession was based upon the statute of parliament.

Americans often attempt to contrast the British monarchy with the American presidency, by maintaining that the British queen is just a figurehead, and therefor irrelevant. The fact that the presidency is styled on the dictatorial model of the Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell is overlooked, as is the fact that the British monarch still possesses what are termed in the British constitution "prerogative powers." Walter Bagehot, an eminent writer on the British constitution, surprised everyone when he listed all the things the queen could do without the consent of parliament. But this is only because the Crown is the very heart of the system of government, and to remove the Crown would be to destroy the system.

The restoration of constitutional institutions in the United States would necessitate the restoration of the crown, however, the nature of this institution is best captured in the British constitution, which is the foundation of the ancient constitution in America. In English law, prerogative powers are the residue of discretionary powers and legal immunities that are left in the hands of the monarch. As regards immunity, however, a distinction arises between those peculiar to the monarch in his "natural" capacity and confined to him (such as the rule that he is personally exempt from all jurisdiction and cannot be sued for debt) and those that belong to the monarch's political capacity, which extend to the whole government carried out in his name (such as the immunity at common law of "the crown" from being sued by ordinary civil process). English law has never clearly distinguished between the two capacities, so that the sovereign is completely identified with the state, indeed, modern British constitutional law does not employ the term "the state." All writs run in the sovereign's name.

Prerogative powers of the sovereign, as distinct from powers conferred on the sovereign by statute, can generally be exercised by the sovereign only on the advice of elected ministers, or in particular forms and by the use of particular instruments. In foreign relations the king has the exclusive power of making war and of declaring peace. The power is usually exercised by a proclamation and an order in council and, as such, it is binding on the courts. In practice the power is never exercised except with the approval of parliament. The king can make what treaties he pleases; whether he can cede territory by negotiation of such a treaty is more doubtful and is much disputed; but he can extend the national territory, such as by incorporating an area of open sea into territorial waters.

The king's prerogative in respect of foreign relations does not entitle him, whether pursuant to treaty or otherwise, to deprive the subject of his rights. It rests with the crown alone to "recognize" foreign governments as de jure governments. Such recognition is binding on the courts and, by a logical sequence, so is a declaration by the crown that a particular person is entitled to the status of a foreign sovereign and as such is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts. So, too, with the status of an ambassador and the diplomatic immunity of himself and his suite. The king is head of the naval and military forces of the country and can alone recruit them. However, the raising, recruiting, and discipline of the armed forces are regulated by the statutes of parliament.

It is the sole prerogative of the king to summon, prorogue, and dissolve parliament. This is an executive, not a legislative, act and is performed only on the advice of ministers, who are elected members of parliament. It may be regarded as an accepted constitutional convention, at any rate since 1924 in Great Britain, that the sovereign cannot refuse to dissolve parliament when requested to do so by a prime minister. But the king might still dissolve parliament against the wishes of his prime minister under certain circumstances, e.g., should a prime minister, having been defeated on a direct vote of confidence in the House of Commons, refuse to resign or to ask for a dissolution.

The theory of the law is that the government of the country is still a matter of prerogative, although many of the executive powers now exercised by the crown have been conferred upon it by statute, in particular the power of making statutory rules and orders to carry a statute into effect. All ministers are appointed by the king - on nomination of the prime minister - and "kiss hands," or, as in the case of secretaries of state, receive their seals from the king himself.

In the choice of a prime minister the king has in law, and may have in fact, some discretion. This discretion was illustrated by the selection of Harold Macmillan to succeed Sir Anthony Eden in 1957. All military and naval officers and governors of colonies are appointed by a "commission" from the king. And as the king can appoint, so can he dismiss from every office under the crown, except for judges, the comptroller and auditor general, and the parliamentary commissioner for administration, which are held "during good behavior," subject to removal by parliament. The general view is that servants of the crown have, apart from statute, no legally enforceable right to pay, pension, or security of tenure, but hold their employment "at the pleasure of the crown."

The king is the supreme landowner, a relic of feudal practices, which means that in cases where people die intestate (without a will), and without next of kin, their estates go to the crown. This is also a relic of the most ancient practices of tribes, which possessed homelands in common, and allocation of the land was made by the senior members of the tribe as a council of elders, led by the chief or king. The king is also the depositary of the prerogative of mercy: he can pardon those who offend against his "peace." The king's peace is one of the most ancient principles of Anglo-Saxon law, which made it the responsibility of every national to keep the peace. This prerogative is now exercised exclusively on the advice of the home secretary. The king is the sole grantor of titles such as peerages, baronetcies, and knighthoods, but "honors" are rarely conferred by him except on the advice of elected ministers. He is the "supreme governor" of the Church of England in virtue of the Acts of Supremacy, but in the United States this convention would be subject to the Universal Life Communion, so that the monarch would have a sacral constitutional position, but there would be no established state church, which is really a continuation of the existing state of affairs.

In the course of English history, parliament frequently intervened and abolished particular prerogatives of the crown, and since the Revolution of 1688 it has never been doubted that such a statute binds not only the monarch who actually assents to it but all his successors as well. It was decided long ago that when parliament has by statute regulated "the whole field of the prerogative," then that particular prerogative can be exercised in no other way than that prescribed by the statute of parliament.

In America, however, the constitutional issues revolve around the restoration of the crown, and the accession of a successor to the last legitimate king of America, George III. Americans, when faced with the constitutional issues of legitimacy, are fond of the notion that it doesn't matter what form the government takes, that it is an arbitrary choice. But this falls into the trap that refuses to perceive the fact that there are immutable principles of law that are the basis of government, and not an arbitrary selection of "laws" made by men to benefit themselves at the expense of the nation. When the Founders authored the Constitution of 1787, it was out of thin air. They literally invented it in Philadelphia, and enacted it on a single day. In effect, the Founders did what every school child is told he cannot do, that is to pick and choose what laws he shall obey.

The republic cannot take part in the restoration process, therefor the people must exercise their sovereign authority by acclaiming a candidate for king. The Nationalist movement supports the Ely-Chaitlin succession in the person of His Royal Highness, Marc Eric Ely-Chaitlin, Regent of the United States. The Regency is the transition institution, developing popular support for the restoration, and the succession of the Ely-Chaitlin claimant. The Regent is the nominal chief of the Americans, establishing a traditional nationalist movement, who has created an outline for the restoration in the Nationalist Manifesto. The Manifesto establishes the Regent's claim to the throne, and sets out guarantees of the Regent to observe the ancient constitution. It also provides authority for the convening of a national American Parliament to enact an Act Restoring the Crown of the United States, and settling the succession. The Parliament would have the authority to restore the Crown, and invest the Regent with the office of king of the United States of America.

The United States republic constitutes a significant departure from the ancient constitutional order of the American people. The majority of the American society's ills can be traced directly to the subversion of the traditional law, by the politicians of the republic since its inception. The interests of the people, instead of being the primary concern of the government, are relegated to a position of secondary importance, while the interests of those rich enough to bribe public officials are put ahead of the national interest, and under the auspices of the republic, are defined AS the national interest. There is only one remedy to this imbalance, and that remedy exists in the restoration of constitutional government in the United States of America.

SOURCE: References herein are derived from the Encyclopedia Britannica (1971) articles entitled, "Representation," (Vol. 19, pg. 152-156) "Proportional Representation," and "Prerogative." (Vol. 18, pg. 639-640, 458-459)